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A fundamental characteristic of emerging markets is the underdevelopment of legal institutions 
and financial markets. Therefore, the marginal value of a firm‟s cash holdings in emerging 
countries can be lower than 1, due to high agency costs resulting from poor external corporate 
governance. However, the marginal value of cash may also be high in emerging markets 
because the information asymmetry between current and new providers of funds is high, which 
means that it is difficult to access the (low quality) capital markets. We study for the industrialized 
countries of China and Germany whether corporate cash holdings contribute to shareholder 
value in both constrained and unconstrained firms. In contradiction to previous literature on 
emerging markets, we find that the marginal value of cash is not smaller than 1 in China, so that 
agency costs do not dominate. We, however, find marginal values of cash lower than 1 for 
unconstrained firms in both countries, implying that in these firms agency costs of cash holdings 
exist. For constrained firms we find marginal values significantly larger than 1 in both countries. 
This indicates difficulties in accessing the financial markets for these firms. These difficulties 
prove to be larger in China than in Germany for small and service firms, but not for high growth 
firms. 
  





A fundamental characteristic of emerging markets is the underdevelopment of legal and financial 
institutions. Such characteristics are likely to influence the marginal value of cash holdings to the 
shareholders. This measure has recently received the attention of researchers (Faulkender and 
Wang, 2006; Pinkowitz et al. 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 
2007; Drobetz et al. 2010; Tong, 2011). According to the free cash flow theory, agency problems 
reduce the marginal value of a firm‟s cash holdings (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). On the 










the financial markets is difficult (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007). In emerging markets, the 
marginal value of cash for firms can be higher because of the costly external financing arising 
from the limited quality of the capital markets. It may, however, also be lower due to high agency 
costs resulting from the poor external corporate governance. Therefore the determination of the 
marginal value of cash becomes an empirical question. 
Previous studies investigate these two conflicting predictions and indicate that agency 
costs are dominant, i.e. the costs of holding cash outweigh the benefits of it (see Drobetz et al. 
2010; Lundstrum, 2003). However, no studies have investigated the difference in marginal value 
of cash holdings between developed and emerging countries for different types of firms. When 
two types of firms have a different marginal value of cash holdings, the opposite effects may 
cancel each other out and this “average effect” may not be a good indicator of the quality of 
investor protection and the ease of access to financial markets. We therefore develop two 
hypotheses based on the implication of the free cash flow theory and the information asymmetry 
theory. We argue that the differences in the level of information asymmetry across countries may 
have more influence on financially constrained firms, and the differences in the shareholder 
protection are more likely to affect the marginal value of cash held by financially unconstrained 
firms.  
Using a sample consisting of German and Chinese firms from 2000 to 2012, we do not 
detect a significant difference in the overall marginal value of cash holdings between developed 
and emerging countries. Contrary to the literature on emerging markets, we find that the 
marginal value of cash is higher than 1 in China. This is also the case in Germany. These 
findings imply that the information cost effects dominate the agency cost effects. However, when 
we discern constrained firms and unconstrained firms, we find comparable marginal values of 
cash significantly lower than 1 for unconstrained firms in both countries. This implies that agency 
costs exist in both countries and that they do not differ between China and Germany for 
unconstrained firms. For constrained firms we find marginal values significantly higher than 1 in 
both countries. This implies difficulties in accessing the financial markets for constrained firms in 
both markets. These effects are larger for small firms and for service firms in China, so that we 
infer a stronger relative information asymmetry between current and future providers of funds in 
China in comparison to Germany.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the 
literature and discuss the theoretical predictions on the marginal value of cash holdings and 
develop the hypotheses. Section 3 explains the design of the empirical tests, the data and the 
sample selection. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
In line with the propositions of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller and Modigliani (1961), the 
questions of how much cash to hold and what value shareholders place on an extra dollar of 
cash held by firms are irrelevant in the world of perfect capital markets. In such markets, holding 
cash has no costs since investors are fully informed and managers always maximize 
shareholders wealth (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007). In such markets, in the absence of taxes 
and transaction costs, firms can always raise funds without any costs and therefore liquidity does 
not enhance firm value (Opler et al. 1999). As such, the irrelevance of liquid assets implies that 
managers would not balance the marginal costs and benefits of liquidity and shareholder wealth 
would not be affected by firms‟ decisions on corporate cash holdings.  
In the real world, however, firms operate in markets with taxes as well as information 
asymmetry and agency costs. Cash reserves provide flexibility which enable firms to finance 
daily activities and to invest in profitable projects (transaction motive and precautionary motive); 
on the other hand, holding cash also causes costs which are derived from the opportunity costs 
due to the interest foregone, the cost-of-carry, and the agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders (Opler et al. 1999). Consequently, not only firms tradeoff the marginal benefits and 
marginal costs of liquid assets but also investors evaluate cash holdings based on their 











2.1. The Marginal Value of Cash Holdings and Agency Costs 
 
Managers, as the agents of the shareholders, are supposed to maximize the wealth of their firms. 
When the interests of managers are fully aligned with that of shareholders, the managerial 
actions taken by managers which benefit themselves simultaneously maximize the wealth of the 
outside investors (Pinkowitz et al. 2006). Agency costs, however, arise when the interests of 
managers differ from those of the shareholders. In such a case, self-interested managers may 
pursue their own objectives at the expense of the shareholders. The issue of how to deploy cash 
holdings is always at the center of this conflict of interests since, as argued by Myers and Rajan 
(1998), cash can be transformed into private benefits more easily than other assets. According to 
the free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986), firms with excess cash are more likely to incur 
agency costs, due to the fact that internal financing keeps managers from being monitored by the 
capital markets and this increases managerial discretion.  
By and large, managers hold cash to reduce the likelihood of financing through costly 
external markets and incurring liquidity constraints (Martinez-Sola et al. 2013). However, when 
shareholder rights are limited, self-interested managers are more likely to hoard excess cash to 
pursue their own interests. They may do so in order to keep control because liquid assets can 
serve as a buffer that protects firms from adverse shocks (Pinkowitz et al. 2006). Moreover, they 
may also use these liquid assets to fulfill their desire of increasing the size and scope of firms 
and the resources under their control in „empire building‟. This hoarding of cash may result in 
subsequent suboptimal investment decision-making which decreases shareholder wealth, 
through frequent acquisitions or investing in negative NPV projects (Harford et al. 2008; Dittmar 
et al. 2003). Lastly, controlling shareholders may also divert such accumulated resources for 
personal interests through tunneling (Johnson et al. 2000). Overall, one would expect that the 
more discretion the managers have, the more likely they are to waste corporate assets in the 
pursuit of private benefits. 
Considering that managers may use the cash resources inefficiently, shareholders may 
choose to use corporate governance mechanisms to alleviate the free cash flow problem. In 
other words, when outside investors anticipate that managers will extract private benefits from 
their control of the liquid assets, they value cash held by firms less (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 
2007). As such and other things being equal, one would expect that the marginal value of cash 
would be higher for shareholders in countries with better investor protection. 
Previous studies investigated the effects of corporate government on cash holdings from 
different perspectives. Dittmar et al. (2003) find that firms in countries with weak shareholder 
rights hold two times more cash as firms in countries with strong investor protection. Pinkowitz et 
al. (2006) focus on this issue from the international perspective. Consistent with agency theory, 
they find that cash holdings are valued more in countries with better shareholders‟ legal 
protection. To test how this country level difference in governance mechanisms affect firms‟ 
market value, Fresard and Salva (2010) hypothesize that investors will value cash more when 
firms cross-list on the U.S. exchange and they find supportive evidence. Furthermore, the 
existing empirical studies provide little evidence of a positive relationship between firm level 
corporate governance structures and the value of cash. For instance, Harford et al. (2008) find 
that US firms with poor corporate governance tend to hold less cash and choose to use excess 
cash for value destroying acquisitions. Most importantly, their findings imply that the “true 
entrenchment requires low legal shareholder rights” (Harford et al. 2008, p.538). Kalcheva and 
Lins (2007) further explain why the existing empirical research on the U.S. in this area fails to find 
evidence that supports the agency theory: the country-level corporate “governance in the U.S. is 
strong enough, so that investors do not systematically discount the value of a poorly governed 
firm with excess cash” (p.1087). They argue that the country-level shareholder protection 
magnifies the benefit and costs of cash and they find that firms with weak corporate governance 














2.2. The Marginal Value of Cash Holdings and Information Costs 
 
Contrary to the free cash flow theory, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that liquid assets have 
value since external financing is costly due to asymmetric information between investors and 
managers, thus financial slack can act as a buffer which enables firms to invest in positive NPV 
projects which they may otherwise have to skip. When the information asymmetry between firms 
and market is pronounced, it is likely that firms can only access to the outside capital market at 
high costs when they need the money. Therefore, firms that have value enhancing projects and 
that have to finance themselves externally with high costs would make suboptimal investment 
decisions, resulting in decreased future growth and firm performance (Denis and Sibilkov, 2010). 
Consequently, internally generated cash would be more helpful for both rational mangers and 
investors in this case. In other words, cash holdings are more valuable when the access to the 
external capital market is costly.  
Consistent with this expectation, Faulkender and Wang (2006) report that the marginal 
value of cash holdings is higher for financially constrained firms compared to unconstrained firms. 
Contrary to their findings, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) find that cash is less valuable for 
firms with less access to the capital markets and they further argue that “…it appears that the 
investment opportunity set rather than the financing opportunity set of the firm has the greatest 
impact on the value that shareholders place on a firm‟s cash holdings” (p.2). Also Drobetz et al. 
(2010) find that the value of corporate cash holdings is lower in countries with a higher degree of 
asymmetric information problems. These conflicting results may be caused by the fact that these 
papers use only one overall measure of the marginal value of cash to a country and that they do 
not distinguish between the needs of constrained and unconstrained firms. 
 
2.3. Developed and Emerging Countries 
 
The previous theoretical arguments can be applied to developed and emerging countries. On 
average, emerging markets are characterized by the under-developed legal and by 
underdeveloped financial institutions. As documented by La Porta et al. (1997), countries with 
poorer investor protection, in terms of legal rules and law enforcement, are associated with 
smaller and limited capital markets. Therefore, based on existing theories and the characteristics 
of emerging markets, the empirical hypotheses may go in two opposite directions. The poor 
shareholder protection in emerging countries may cause severe agency costs of cash holdings 
and thus investors would discount cash held by firms (the agency cost view), while the excess 
cash holdings may also be valued at a premium due to the costly external financing in emerging 
markets (the information cost view).  
Despite these two alternative theoretical arguments, existing empirical studies report 
one-sided evidence, i.e. they combine the high costs of external financing with weak corporate 
governance, and then measure if on average the costs of holding cash outweigh the benefit of it. 
For example, Fan et al. (2008) find that the internal capital market of firms is inefficient when 
corporate governance is bad and “there is no big need for mitigating financing constraints” (Fan 
et al. 2008, p.1). Similarly, De Angelo et al. (2002) argue that without good corporate governance, 
liquid assets provide managers substantial managerial discretion even when firms face financial 
constraints. Furthermore, the findings of Lundstrum (2003) suggest that the firms could not 
realize value from cash holdings when they face more agency problems. 
We contend that on a country level, at least a distinction should be made between 
constrained and unconstrained firms, in order to avoid oversimplifying conclusions. The main 
aim of this study is therefore to explicitly distinguish between the opposite effects of country-level 
differences on the marginal market value of cash holdings. If one of the relationships is dominant, 
we cannot deduce that the opposite effect does not work at all, because it only plays a small part. 
If no relationship can be found, the conclusion that the market value of cash holdings is 
unaffected by both effects will also be inexact, since the conflicting effects may cancel each other 
out. For example, if there are only two firms in a country, the overall marginal value of cash 
holdings is the same when 1) both „agency cost‟ effects and „information cost‟ effects have no 










effects but with opposite signs for both firms or 3) „agency cost‟ effects in one firm and 
„information cost‟ effects in the other firm have the same effects (with opposite signs). In this 
sense we also assess the very strong implicit assumption of much of the previous country 
research that all firms in a country are affected by external environment to the same extent. 
Therefore, instead of being interested in the net effects, i.e. whether the marginal value of cash is 
higher in developed countries or in emerging countries, this study is primarily concerned with 
whether the two conflicting effects exist and whether they influence different firm categories in 
developed and emerging countries differently.  
As discussed in Section 2.2, firms with costly external financing are more likely to give 
up attractive investment opportunities when the internal funds are not available and thus the 
marginal value of cash would be higher for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained 
firms (Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Denis and Sibilkov, 2010). The financially constrained firms 
refer to the firms which face high costs of external financing. For the firms which could raise 
external funds easily, the differences in capital market quality may be trivial and the better 
shareholder rights in developed countries would drive the marginal value of cash to become 
higher for financially unconstrained firms in those countries than in the emerging countries. 
However, the external corporate governance may be less important for financially constrained 
firms. The higher the costs of external financing, the higher the likelihood of forgoing positive 
NPV investment opportunities and thus the interests of managers and minority shareholders are 
more likely to coincide. Furthermore, the higher level of information asymmetry may amplify the 
benefit of holding cash for financially constrained firms and thus make the cash more valuable in 
emerging markets. Consequently, if both the „agency cost effect‟ and „information cost effect‟ are 
at work, it may be wise to distinguish financially constrained firms from unconstrained firms. The 
marginal value of cash would then be higher for financially unconstrained firms in developed 
markets than for those firms in emerging markets; while investors will place a higher value on 
cash held by financially constrained firms in emerging markets relative to those in developed 
markets. These relationships are shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Marginal Value of Cash in Emerging and Developed Markets for 
Unconstrained and Constrained Firms 
 
This reasoning also leads to the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: For financially unconstrained firms, the marginal value of cash holdings is higher 
in developed countries than in emerging countries 
Hypothesis 2: For financially constrained firms, the marginal value of cash holdings is higher in 










3. Methodology and Data 
3.1. Methodology 
 
To investigate the differences in marginal value of cash holdings across developed countries and 
emerging countries, we use a regression model which relates the change of firm value to an 
additional dollar held by firms as well as to changes in other firm characteristics. Faulkender and 
Wang (2006) develop an empirical methodology to estimate the marginal value of cash holdings 
in relation to corporate financial policies. We build on the long-term event study method based on 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) to measure the marginal value of corporate cash holdings. 
Specifically, our baseline regression equation is as follows: 
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                                                        𝛾9𝐿𝑖 ,𝑡 ∗
∆𝐶𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑀𝑖 ,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾10𝑀𝐵𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛾11𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖 ,𝑡                      (1) 
 
where ∆𝑋𝑖 ,𝑡  indicates the change in the level of variable X of firm i from year t-1 to year t; 𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡  
indicates the stock return during year t; 𝑀𝑖 ,𝑡−1 is the market value of equity of the previous year 
t-1; 𝐶𝑖 ,𝑡represents the cash holdings at time t; 𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡  is earnings before interest and extraordinary 
items; 𝑁𝐴𝑖 ,𝑡  is net assets of year t; 𝐼𝑖 ,𝑡  is interest expense; 𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡  is total dividend; 𝐿𝑖 ,𝑡  indicates 
the market leverage at the end of year t; 𝑀𝐵𝑖 ,𝑡−1 and 𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡−1 stand for the market to book value 
and size of firm i at the beginning of year t, respectively. 
The dependent variable 𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡  is firm i‟s stock return over year t. According to Fama and 
French (1993), size and market-to-book ratio capture common variation in stock returns. We 
control for the expected stock return by incorporating Size (𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡−1) and market-to-book ratio 
(𝑀𝐵𝑖 ,𝑡−1) as control variables on the right-hand-side of our regression model. By doing so, we 
deviate from Faulkender and Wang (2006), who subtract the returns of 25 portfolios (based on 
five Fama and French size and for each size portfolio also five book to market portfolios) from the 
concomitant firm‟s raw returns. With regard to other independent variables, we follow Faulkender 
and Wang (2006) by controlling for changes of firm‟s profitability (𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡), financing (𝐼𝑖 ,𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡 ,𝐿𝑖 ,𝑡) and 
investment (𝑁𝐴𝑖 ,𝑡).
1






 and 𝐿𝑖 ,𝑡 ∗
∆𝐶𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑀𝑖 ,𝑡−1
, are added 
since they argue that the marginal value of cash is decreasing with the increase of corporate 
cash position and debt level. Accordingly, including lagged relative cash holdings and leverage is 
to ensure that the estimates of the interaction terms reflect the effects of cash position and 
leverage level on the marginal value of cash correctly.  
The first task is to test whether the marginal value of cash holdings is higher for 
shareholders in developed countries than in emerging countries or the other way around. We 
then do not yet discriminate between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. If the 
underdeveloped financial systems make investors in emerging countries to believe that the costs 
of asymmetric information is higher than the costs of agency problems, corporate cash holdings 
would be more valuable for shareholders in emerging countries. Alternatively, if investors in 
emerging countries believe that the poor shareholder protection would cause severe agency 
costs which may outweigh the costs of asymmetric information, the marginal value of cash would 
be lower for shareholders in these countries.  
To test this, we make the country dummy interact with the change in cash holdings and 


























                                   
∆𝐶𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑀𝑖 ,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾9𝐿𝑖 ,𝑡 ∗
∆𝐶𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑀𝑖 ,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾10𝑀𝐵𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛾11𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛾12𝐶𝐷𝑈𝑀 ∗
∆𝐶𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑀𝑖 ,𝑡−1
+ 𝜖𝑖 ,𝑡        (2) 
                                                             
1
 R&D expenditure (𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡) and net financing (∆𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 ) are excluded from our baseline regression model because of 
insufficient data. 
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The interaction term, Country dummy*∆ Cash holdings, is introduced to capture the 
effects of country-level differences on the marginal value of cash holdings. The country dummy, 
𝐶𝐷𝑈𝑀, is set equal to 1 for firms in emerging countries and 0 for firms in developed countries. As 
such, the coefficient 𝛾12 represents the additional marginal value of cash in emerging countries 
in comparison to developed countries. 
 
3.2. Sample, Data and Summary Statistics 
 
In this study, we use a sample consisting of German and Chinese firms. Germany (developed 
country) and China (emerging country) are both industrial countries and the largest economic 
entities in Europe and Asia, respectively. It is thus interesting to empirically test the difference of 
the market value of cash holdings in these two counties.  
We obtain firm-level data from Datastream (stock market data) and Thomson Financial‟s 
Worldscope database (accounting data). The initial sample consists of all firms listed on the 
Frankfurt stock exchange (German firms) and on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges 
(Chinese firms) from 1999 to 2012.
3
 First, firms with incomplete data are excluded from our 
sample. We then exclude financial firms (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code between 
6000 and 6999) due to the involvement of cash and marketable securities in inventories; and the 
utility firms (SIC code between 4900 and 4999) that are subject to regulatory supervision from 
the whole sample as well (Opler et al. 1999). Furthermore, because cross-listed firms may be 
subject to different regulations and thus bias the results, we drop firms that are cross listed on 
German and Chinese exchanges by identifying the prefix of ISIN (International Security 
Identification Number) code. Accordingly, firms without SIC or ISIN code are eliminated from the 
whole sample.  
As the Datastream and Worldscope data are expressed in local currencies, we convert 
renminbi (RMB) into euro (EUR) so as to ensure the comparability of the subsamples.
4
 The 
market return is calculated as the change of market value (Datastream item MV) throughout the 
whole year,𝑀𝑖 ,𝑡−𝑀𝑖 ,𝑡−1, over the market value at the beginning of the year, 𝑀𝑖 ,𝑡−1. Cash holdings 
are defined as cash and cash equivalents (Worldscope item 02005). Earnings are net income 
before extraordinary items (Worldscope item 01751) plus interest expense on debt (Worldscope 
item 01251).
5
 Net assets are calculated as total assets (Worldscope item 02999) minus cash 
and cash equivalents (Worldscope item 02005). Dividends are total cash common dividends 
paid (Worldscope item 05376). Leverage is defined as total debt (Worldscope item 03255) 
divided by the sum of total debt and market value of equity (Datastream item MV). Size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (Worldscope item 02999). We also use market 
value to book value (Datastream item MTBV) and interest expense (Worldscope item 01251).  
Following Faulkender and Wang (2006), we exclude all the observations with negative 
net assets, market value or dividends. All the variables are winsorized at 5% and 95% tails to 
mitigate the potential bias due to outliers. After the screening process, our final sample contains 
780 (893) firms with 7,126 (2,944) firm-year observations for German (Chinese) firms.  
In a world characterized by imperfect capital markets, larger firms have a greater ability 
to increase external funding since they are generally more mature, better known and less risky 
than small firms (Almeida et al. 2004). Therefore, to further test the implications of the „agency 
cost effect‟ and the „information cost effect‟, we use firm size, measured as the natural logarithm 
of total assets, as the first criterion to separate financially constrained and unconstrained firms 
(Faulkender and Wang, 2006). For each year of the sample period, we rank firms based on their 
size at the beginning of that year and assign the firms of which sizes are smaller (greater) than 
the median of the annual size distribution to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group. 
                                                             
3
 1-year lagged data is required since the changes of some variables are needed according to the regression mode of 
this study. 
4
 The exchange rates (as of December 31
st
 of each year) we use come from http://www.xe.com/currencytables/.  
5
 Faulkender and Wang (2006) calculate earnings as earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax 
credits, and investment tax credits. We follow their method but do not include deferred tax credits and investment tax 










Table 1 presents the summary statistics on the variables for the sample of German 
(Panel A) and Chinese firms (Panel B). We can see that the mean stock return of both German 
and Chinese firms is much higher than their corresponding median return, suggesting that the 
distributions of stock return of both samples are right-skewed. Moreover, the average annual 
return of Chinese firms (15.49%) is higher than that of German firms (9.52%). On average, 
German firms (26.88%) hold more than twice as much cash and cash equivalents as Chinese 
firms (13.21%) and the market leverage ratio is also significantly higher in German firms (23.78%) 
relative to Chinese firms (16.64%). The mean firm of both samples has similar size, but the 
German group has a larger standard deviation. Finally, the mean, median, minimum and 
maximum market-to-book ratios are all much higher in Chinese firms than in German firms; 
particularly, even the minimum market-to-book ratio of Chinese firms is more than 1 (1.1200) 
during our sample period. 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for the 2000-2012 Sample Period 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Germany 
ri,t  8565 0.095 a) 0.516 0.005 b) -0.716 1.369 
∆Ci,t 7665 0.006 a) 0.130 0.002 b) -0.277 0.305 
∆Ei,t 7465 0.034 a) 0.184 0.009 b) -0.296 0.582 
∆NAi,t 7657 0.029 a) 0.344 0.030 b) -0.785 0.797 
∆Ii,t 7475 0.000 a) 0.014 0.000 b) -0.036 0.032 
∆Di,t 7337 0.001 a) 0.014 0.000  -0.036 0.032 
Ci,t−1 7843 0.269 a) 0.270 0.172 b) 0.017 1.026 
Li,t 8468 0.238 a) 0.232 0.175 b) 0.000 0.743 
Si,t−1 8722 11.965 2.075 11.619 b) 8.743 16.417 
MBi,t−1 8513 2.085 a) 1.695 1.550 b) 0.128 6.780 
Panel B: China 
ri,t  13557 0.155 a) 0.628 -0.049 b) -0.564 1.870 
∆Ci,t 13511 0.012 a) 0.061 0.005 b) -0.091 0.165 
∆Ei,t 13162 0.006 a) 0.032 0.003 b) -0.060 0.090 
∆NAi,t 13501 0.087 a) 0.141 0.052 b) -0.122 0.469 
∆Ii,t 13163 0.002 a) 0.005 0.001 b) -0.001 0.014 
∆Di,t 3024 0.002 a) 0.007 0.000  -0.012 0.019 
Ci,t−1 13523 0.132 a) 0.104 0.102 b) 0.013 0.388 
Li,t 15505 0.166 a) 0.150 0.125 b) 0.000 0.502 
Si,t−1 16467 11.943 1.083 11.879 b) 10.069 14.222 
MBi,t−1 13492 3.973 a) 2.548 3.240 b) 1.120 10.680 
Notes: This table contains descriptive statistics (number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation 
(SD), median, minimum and maximum) of main variables for the two samples used in this paper: German 










winsorized at 5% and 95% tails. 𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 , is stock i‟s annual return during year t. All variables except return (r), 
leverage (L), firms size (S) and market-to-book ratio (𝑀𝐵) are standardized by firm‟s lagged market value 
(𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1). ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡  represents the one-year change in the level of variable X. 𝐶𝑖,𝑡  is cash holdings which is 
defined as cash and cash equivalents. 𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡  is earnings before interest and extraordinary itemsplus interest 
expense on debt; 𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡  is calculated as total assets minus cash and cash equivalents; 𝐼𝑖 ,𝑡  is interest 
expense; 𝐷𝑖,𝑡  is total cash common dividends paid; 𝐿𝑖 ,𝑡  is measured as total debt divided by the sum of 
total debt and market value of equity; 𝑀𝐵𝑖 ,𝑡−1 is market value to book value and 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 is measured as 
natural logarithm of total assets. a) indicates that the means of two samples are significantly different from 
each other at a 5% level using t-test assuming unequal variances; b) indicates that the median of two 
samples are significantly different from each other at a 5% level based on a Mann-Whitney test. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
In this section, the results of our empirical tests are reported. We first examine the cross-country 
differences in marginal value of cash between German and Chinese samples in Section 4.1. 
Then we investigate the implications of those two conflicting theoretical views („agency cost 
theory‟ and „information cost effect‟) in Section 4.2 by separating and comparing the financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms. Finally, we discuss the robustness of the results by 
subdividing the samples according to industry classification (Section 4.3) and growth 
opportunities (Section 4.4).   
 
4.1. Marginal Value of Cash Holdings 
 
We first measure the market value of cash holdings for the mean firms in different countries. The 
results of the regression models (equation 1 and equation 2 discussed in Section 3.1) are 
displayed in Table 2. The first and second column show that an additional euro of cash is worth 
€1.502 (€1.653) for the German (Chinese) firms with no debt obligations and no cash on hand. 
Furthermore, the significant negative coefficients of these two interaction terms for both groups 
are consistent with the findings of Faulkender and Wang (2006) who argue that both the cash 
balance and leverage have negative effects on the marginal value of cash. Although the „no cash 
no debt‟ firms in China obtain more benefits from an additional euro of cash than those firms in 
Germany (€1.653 versus €1.502), the sensitivities of cash value to both the cash level and 
leverage are higher in Chinese firms. More specifically, other things being equal, the marginal 
cash value of a German firm with cash holdings equivalent to 10% of its market value is 5.85 
cents lower (-0.585*10%) than a firm with zero cash balances, while a Chinese firm will lose 
15.57 (-1.557*10%) cents of cash value by holding 10% more cash on hand. Similarly, for every 
10% increase in leverage ratio, the contribution of one extra euro of cash to firm value will 



























Table 2. The Market Value of Cash Holdings 
Independent variables Germany China Whole sample 
∆Ci,t 1.502*** (0.077) 1.653*** (0.233) 1.603*** (0.079) 
∆Ei,t 0.263*** (0.027) 1.506*** (0.202) 0.302*** (0.027) 
∆NAi,t 0.230*** (0.016) 0.462*** (0.060) 0.211*** (0.016) 
∆Ii,t -1.691*** (0.356) 3.094* (1.621) -1.792*** (0.361) 
∆Di,t 1.723*** (0.347) 0.671 (0.883) 1.263*** (0.343) 
Ci,t−1 0.599*** (0.028) 1.108*** (0.115) 0.735*** (0.028) 
Li,t -0.881*** (0.038) -1.062*** (0.086) -1.073*** (0.036) 
Si,t−1 -0.088*** (0.012) -0.019 (0.022) -0.087*** (0.011) 
MBi,t−1 0.068*** (0.004) -0.042*** (0.004) -0.069*** (0.003) 
Ci,t−1 ∗ ∆Ci,t -0.585*** (0.114) -1.557* (0.936) -0.590*** (0.117) 
Li,t ∗ ∆Ci,t -1.186*** (0.145) -1.197* (0.716) -1.297*** (0.147) 
CDUM ∗ ∆Ci,t   0.064 (0.164) 
Intercept 1.370*** (0.144) 0.449* (0.269) 1.400*** (0.137) 
Observations 7,126 2,944 10,070 
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.67 0.42 
Notes: This table displays the results of fixed effects panel regressions examining the market value of cash holdings, 
covering the period from 2000 to 2012. All the variables are winsorized at 5% and 95% tails. The dependent variable, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 , 
is stock i‟s annual return during year t. All variables except return (r), leverage (L), firms size (S) and market-to-book ratio 
(𝑀𝐵) are standardized by firm‟s lagged market value (𝑀𝑖 ,𝑡−1). ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡  represents the one-year change in the level of 
variable X. 𝐶𝑖 ,𝑡  is cash holdings which is defined as cash and cash equivalents. 𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡  is earnings before interest and 
extraordinary itemsplus interest expense on debt; 𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡  is calculated as total assets minus cash and cash equivalents; 
𝐼𝑖 ,𝑡  is interest expense; 𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡  is total cash common dividends paid; 𝐿𝑖,𝑡  is measured as total debt divided by the sum of 
total debt and market value of equity; 𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 is market value to book value and 𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡−1 is measured as natural logarithm 
of total assets. CDUM is a dummy variable which is set equal to 1 for firms in China and 0 for firms in Germany. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
Recall that the average German (Chinese) firm holds cash which equals to 26.88% 
(13.21%) of their market value of equity, and the mean leverage ratio is 23.78% (16.64%). 
Therefore, the value of an incremental euro to shareholders is €1.06 (=€1.502+ (-€0.585*0.2688) 
+ (-€1.186*0.2378)) and €1.25 (=€1.653+ (-€1.557*0.1321) + (-€1.197*0.1664)) in the mean 
German and Chinese firm, respectively. These results indicate that an extra euro of cash is worth 
more than its full value (1€) for mean firms, suggesting that investors in both countries may 
consider corporate cash holdings primarily as precautionary savings. Moreover, even though the 
marginal value of cash in Chinese firms is decreasing faster than that in the German 
counterparts as cash holdings and leverage increase, an additional euro of cash is still more 
valuable for Chinese firms because of their low cash and leverage level on average. However, as 
seen in the last column of table 2, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term, Country 
dummy*∆Cash holdings, is positive but insignificantly different from zero.6 Thus, we cannot 





4.2. Financial Constraints 
 
As discussed earlier, if the marginal value of cash in one country is not significantly different from 
that in the other, the underlying reason could be that either both „agency cost‟ effect and 
„information cost‟ effect have no significant influence on firm value through cash holdings or that 
their opposite effects cancel each other out. Therefore, we split the sample into financially 
                                                             
6
 We also add the interactions terms, Country dummy* Cash holdingst-1*∆Cash holdings and Country 
dummy*Leverage*∆Cash holdings, to verify our results are robust to the differences in the effects of cash and leverage 
level on cash values among counties. The main results do not change. 
7
 The difference in marginal value of cash between the mean German firm (€1.06) and Chinese firm (€1.25) is also not 










constrained and unconstrained firms to test whether the country-level difference in marginal 
value of cash exists in different firm categories. 
We separate for each country the sample into financially constrained (C) and 
unconstrained (U), while using three definitions of constraints. First, we consider that small firms 
are more constrained than large firms. Second, we assume that industrial firms are less 
constrained than non-industrial firms and, third, we assume that growth firms are more 
constrained than non-growth firms. Table 3 reports the regression results for firms smaller and 
larger than the median size. In Panel A the estimated coefficients of marginal value of cash (after 
controlling for the effects of cash holdings and leverage levels) is higher for financially 
constrained firms than for unconstrained firms for both the German and the Chinese samples. 
Moreover, the difference is significant at 5% confidence level for Chinese firms (1.051 versus 
2.324 for financially unconstrained firms and constrained firms, respectively) but not for German 
firms (where the financially constrained firms also have a larger coefficient for the marginal value 
of cash (1.693) than the financially unconstrained firms (1.205)).This finding is consistent with 
the argument that the high cost of external financing increases the possibility of forgoing value 
enhancing projects and thus increase the benefits of holding cash. The relatively small and 
insignificant difference in the marginal value of cash between two German subgroups suggests 
that the developed capital market in German mitigates some market frictions for financially 
constrained firms.  
Moreover, the absolute value of the estimates corresponding to the interactions, Cash 
holdingst-1*∆Cash holdings and Leverage*∆Cash holdings, are higher for financially constrained 
firms than for financially unconstrained firms in both country groups. As the cash level reduces, 
both the likelihood of having to raise funds externally and the costs of doing so increase, and this 
relationship is stronger for financially constrained firms. So the incremental benefits provided by 
€1 extra cash in financially constrained firms are larger than that of financially unconstrained 
firms. These findings are consistent with the results of Faulkender and Wang (2006). 
We then calculate the marginal cash value for the mean firms as above and report the 
results in the Panel B of Table 3. For financially unconstrained firms, one additional euro of cash 
held by a mean German (Chinese) firm contributes € 0.84 (€ 0.81) to its firm value. This implies 
that when external funds are easy to access (as in the case of large firms), firms are not 
supposed to hold excess cash and investors would consider the cash holdings as a potential 
source of agency problem and thus value the cash with 16 (19) cents less than its full value in 
Germany (China). This may be indicative of agency problems in the financially unconstrained 
(larger) firms. Though the marginal value of cash in Germany (€ 0.84) is somewhat higher than 
that value in China, the difference between German and Chinese unconstrained firms does not 
differ, suggesting that hypothesis 1 is not confirmed. 
For the constrained (small) firms, the marginal value of cash is €1.22 and €1.79 for 
German and Chinese firms, respectively, and these values are significantly different from each 
other. Consistent with the „information cost‟ view, the results suggest that constrained Chinese 
firms reap much more benefits from holding one extra euro than their German counterparts. 
When it is costly for firms to access external financial markets, the interests of managers are 
more likely to be aligned with those of investors for two reasons. On the one hand, the 
underinvestment problems resulting from high costs of external financing may result in 
decreased future growth and firm performance, which goes against the interests of both 
managers and shareholders. On the other hand, using firm size as the financial constraint 
criterion, the constrained (small) firms typically have less agency problems than financially 
unconstrained (large) firms according to Jensen‟s free cash flow theory (1986). As such, for 
constrained firms, the big difference in marginal value of cash holdings, €1.22 versus €1.79 (in 
Germany and China, respectively), reflects a disparity of capital market development between 
these two countries. In other words, the country-level information asymmetry is so pronounced in 
China that investors systematically value cash at a premium for financially constrained firms 
relative to the German counterparts. As such, the empirical results support hypothesis 2.  
Overall, the results of our empirical tests provide strong evidence on „information cost‟ 










for financially unconstrained firms while they amplify the benefit of cash holdings for financially 
constrained firms.  
 





U (large) C (small) U (large) C (small) 
∆Ci,t 1.205***(0.104) 1.693***(0.120) 1.051***(0.303) 2.324***(0.449) 
p(U-C=0) 0.30 0.04 
∆Ei,t 0.421***(0.038) 0.179***(0.038) 1.827***(0.231) 0.482(0.413) 
∆NAi,t 0.161***(0.020) 0.283***(0.027) 0.452***(0.066) 0.572***(0.135) 
∆Ii,t -1.731***(0.423) -1.114*(0.605) -0.850(1.798) 19.691***(3.657) 
∆Di,t 1.707***(0.393) 1.972***(0.615) -0.509(1.021) 3.906**(1.694) 
Ci,t−1 0.559***(0.038) 0.648***(0.044) 0.750***(0.129) 1.888***(0.265) 
Li,t -1.077***(0.051) -0.747***(0.060) -1.105***(0.098) -1.332***(0.197) 
Si,t−1 -0.088***(0.020) -0.062***(0.019) 0.055(0.034) -0.127**(0.050) 
MBi,t−1 -0.090***(0.006) -0.065***(0.006) -0.057***(0.005) -0.034***(0.006) 
Ci,t−1 ∗ ∆Ci,t -0.444***(0.140) -0.702***(0.188) -0.401(1.032) -3.502(2.711) 
Li,t ∗ ∆Ci,t -0.816***(0.189) -1.511***(0.256) -0.665(0.794) -1.296(1.958) 
Intercept 1.655***(0.273) 0.856***(0.203) -0.381(0.432) 1.595***(0.572) 
Observ. d) 3,727 3,399 1,577 1,367 
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.49 0.72 0.66 
Panel B 
Ci,t−1 (mean) 0.258 a) 0.280 a) 0.157 a) 0.107 a) 
Li,t (mean) 0.310 a) 0.183 a) 0.236 a) 0.123 a) 
The Marginal  
Value of €1 
€ 0.84 c) € 1.22 b) c) € 0.81 € 1.79 b) c) 
Notes: This table presents results for unconstrained (U) and constrained (C) firms in 2000-2012. For each year we rank 
firms based on their size at the beginning of that year and assign the firms of which sizes are smaller (greater) than the 
median of the annual size distribution to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group. All the variables are 
winsorized at 5% and 95%. The dependent variable, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 , is stock i‟s annual return during year t. All variables except 
return (r), leverage (L), firms size (S) and market-to-book ratio (MB) are standardized by firm‟s lagged market value 
(MBi,t−1). ∆Xi,t represents the one-year change in the level of variable X. Ci,t  is cash holdings which is defined as cash 
and cash equivalents. Ei,t is earnings before interest and extraordinary items plus interest expense on debt; NAi,t is 
calculated as total assets minus cash and cash equivalents; 𝑙𝑖 ,𝑡  is interest expense; Di,t is total cash common dividends 
paid; Li,t is measured as total debt divided by the sum of total debt and market value of equity; MBi,t−1 is market value 
to book value and Si,t−1 is measured as natural logarithm of total assets. p(U-C=0) is the p-value of the added interaction 
term (constrained dummy*∆Ci,t) to the equations.to test whether there is a significant difference in marginal value of cash 
between constrained and unconstrained firms. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1percent level, respectively. In Panel B a) indicates significant differences between German and 
Chinese firms at 5% level using the t-test and assuming unequal variances. b) indicates significant differences between 
German and Chinese firms at 5% level based on the Wald test c) indicates significant differences from 1 at 5% level 
based on the Wald test. 
 
4.3. Industrial and Nonindustrial Firms 
 
As Germany and China are both industrialized countries, it is also interesting to study whether 
the marginal value of cash differs by industry classifications. The arguments are similar to that of 
constrained and unconstrained firms. Compared to industrial firms, service firms are usually 
younger, smaller (due to a lower need for assets), and they have less collateral, which implies 
that they are more risky to investors. So liquidity would be more valuable for the service firms to 
finance their investments than for industrial firms. Moreover, less employees and more simple 
organizational structures may cause less agency conflicts in nonindustrial firms. In contrast, 










also have a more complicated organizational configuration and wider dispersion of ownership. 
This may therefore result in more severe agency problems between managers and investors. As 
such, one could thus assume that the marginal value of cash is smaller in unconstrained 
(industrial) firms in comparison to constrained (service) firms. 
We split the sample of both countries into industrial and nonindustrial firms (based on 
SIC code) and find a further empirical support for our hypotheses. The regression results are 
presented in Table 4 below. As seen from Panel A, the increased amount of firm value 
associated with one unit change in cash holdings is higher in nonindustrial firms than in industrial 
firms for both countries (€1.440 versus €1.552 for the German sample and €1.222 versus €2.109 
for the Chinese sample). However, the cross-industry difference in the marginal value of cash is 
only significant for Chinese firms (p-value=0.01). Panel B provides the marginal value of cash 
holdings of mean firms for each subgroup. Again, consistent with the „information cost‟ theory, 
the higher level of information asymmetry amplifies the benefit of cash holdings for Chinese 
nonindustrial firms (€ 1.64 versus € 1.13), and the difference between these two numbers is 
statistically significant. Meanwhile, the marginal value of cash of the mean Chinese industrial firm 
is a little lower than that of German counterpart (€ 0.95 versus € 0.99), but they are not 
significantly different from each other, which implies that hypothesis 1 is –again- rejected. 
However, information cost effects have a stronger impact on the marginal value of cash 
for nonindustrial firms and these results support our second hypothesis and they are also 
consistent with our earlier results when we made a distinction between small and large firms. 
 





I N I N 
∆Ci,t 1.440***(0.108) 1.552***(0.111) 1.222***(0.319) 2.109***(0.339) 
p(I－N=0) 0.70 0.01 
∆Ei,t 0.306***(0.039) 0.239***(0.037) 1.346***(0.253) 1.763***(0.343) 
∆NAi,t 0.180***(0.022) 0.273***(0.025) 0.358***(0.074) 0.741***(0.103) 
∆Ii,t -0.634(0.457) -2.941***(0.566) 3.393(2.069) 3.146(2.599) 
∆Di,t 1.364***(0.441) 2.172***(0.553) 1.840(1.211) -0.520(1.257) 
Ci,t−1 0.624***(0.039) 0.628***(0.042) 1.033***(0.147) 1.266***(0.186) 
Li,t -1.071 ***(0.051) -0.666***(0.057) -1.013***(0.110) -1.219***(0.142) 
Si,t−1 -0.111***(0.017) -0.067***(0.017) 0.005(0.028) -0.080**(0.038) 
MBi,t−1 -0.082***(0.006) -0.058***(0.006) -0.037***(0.005) -0.054***(0.007) 
Ci,t−1 ∗ ∆Ci,t -0.428***(0.159) -0.712***(0.164) -1.253(1.149) -0.188(1.724) 
Li,t ∗ ∆Ci,t -1.234***(0.204) -1.081***(0.217) -0.536(0.921) -2.813**(1.153) 
Intercept 1.802***(0.211) 0.965***(0.195) 0.157(0.091) 1.226***(0.464) 
Observations 3,694 3,432 1,760 1,184 
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.47 0.67 0.70 
Panel B 
Ci,t−1 (mean) 0.252 a) 0.286 a) 0.140 a) 0.122 a) 
Li,t (mean) 0.275 a) 0.200 a) 0.172 a) 0.159 a) 
The Marginal  
Value of €1 
€ 0.99 € 1.13 b) c) € 0.95 € 1.64 b) c) 
Notes: This table presents results for industrial firms (I: Standard Industrial Classification Code from 3000 to 5999) and 
nonindustrial firms (N) from 2000 to 2012. All the variables are winsorized at 5% and 95%. The dependent variable, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 , 
is stock i‟s annual return during year t. All variables except return (r), leverage (L), firms size (S) and market-to-book ratio 
(MB) are standardized by firm‟s lagged market value (Mi,t−1). ∆Xi,t represents the one-year change in the level of 
variable X. Ci,t  is cash holdings which is defined as cash and cash equivalents. Ei,t is earnings before interest and 
extraordinary items plus interest expense on debt; NAi,t is calculated as total assets minus cash and cash equivalents; 










total debt and market value of equity; MBi,t−1 is market value to book value and Si,t−1 is measured as natural logarithm 
of total assets. p(I-N=0) is the p-value of the added interaction term (industrial dummy*∆Ci,t) to the equations.to test 
whether there is a significant difference in marginal value of cash between industrial and non-industrial firms. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1percent level, respectively. In 
Panel B a) indicates significant differences between German and Chinese firms at 5% level using the t-test and assuming 
unequal variances. b) indicates significant differences between German and Chinese firms at 5% level based on the 
Wald test c) indicates significant differences from 1 at 5% level based on the Wald test. 
 
4.4. The Marginal Value of Cash and Growth Opportunities 
 
Lastly, using market-to-book ratios as proxies for growth opportunities, we separate each 
country sample into low growth and high growth subsamples and report the regression results in 
Table 5 below. Again, the estimated coefficients of the change in cash are highly significant for 
all subgroups. Moreover, the marginal value of cash is also larger in high growth firms in 
comparison to low growth firms, though the difference in the estimates between low growth 
opportunities and high growth opportunities is now only statistically significant for the German 
sample (p-value=0.00). For firms with average cash and leverage (panel B) and with poor growth 
prospects, one extra euro of cash is worth € 0.63 (€ 0.83) in mean German (Chinese) firms. In 
addition the significant difference between these coefficients means that the first hypothesis is 
rejected (for the third time).  
Table 5 Panel B shows that additional cash holdings in firms with higher growth 
opportunities are higher than 1 in both countries as the marginal value of cash is €1.57 and €1.47 
for German and Chinese firms, respectively. These findings are again in line with the results of 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) applied to growth firms: high growth firms are constrained and the 
marginal value of cash in these firms is higher than that in low growth firms. However, high 
growth firms in Germany happen to have a higher marginal value of cash than the comparable 
firms in China. This means that the underdevelopment of the financial opportunities in the 
emerging Chinese market (hypothesis 2) is not confirmed for growth firms. This might be caused 
by the abundance of growth in Chinese firms in comparison to German firms: because the 
occurrence of high growth in Germany is relatively rare, investors in German firms do value cash 









L H L H 
∆Ci,t 0.887***(0.104) 2.007***(0.122) 1.300***(0.286) 1.803***(0.416) 
p(L－H=0) 0.00  0.71  
∆Ei,t 0.267***(0.032) 0.317***(0.050) 1.751***(0.260) 0.997***(0.323) 
∆NAi,t 0.211***(0.020) 0.306***(0.030) 0.384***(0.072) 0.628***(0.108) 
∆Ii,t -1.545***(0.430) -1.336**(0.672) 5.267***(1.866) -1.048(2.988) 
∆Di,t 1.834***(0.440) 1.662***(0.558) 0.608(0.986) 2.040(1.742) 
Ci,t−1 0.397***(0.036) 0.815***(0.065) 0.408***(0.148) 1.512***(0.215) 
Li,t -1.124***(0.054) -0.865***(0.060) -1.288***(0.112) -1.164***(0.157) 
Si,t−1 -0.036*(0.019) -0.091***(0.017) 0.096**(0.039) -0.150***(0.034) 
MBi,t−1 -0.334***(0.023) -0.056***(0.006) -0.119***(0.015) -0.049***(0.006) 
Ci,t−1 ∗ ∆Ci,t -0.121(0.135) -0.253(0.273) -0.611(1.148) -1.820(1.644) 
Li,t ∗ ∆Ci,t -0.702***(0.172) -2.106***(0.304) -1.726**(0.846) -1.071(1.312) 
Intercept 1.133***(0.234) 1.332***(0.208) -0.681(0.474) 2.097***(0.412) 
Observations 3,600 3,526 1,489 1,455 











Ci,t−1 (mean) 0.366 a) 0.172 a) 0.167 a) 0.097 a) 
Li,t (mean) 0.308 a) 0.185 a) 0.215 a) 0.143 a) 
The Marginal Value 
of €1 
€ 0.63 b) c) € 1.57 c) € 0.83 b)  € 1.47 c)  
Notes: This table presents results for low (Low) and high (High) growth opportunities firms in 2000-2012. 
For each year we rank firms based on their market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the year is, and if it is 
smaller (greater) than the median firms are assigned to the low (high) growth opportunity group. All the 
variables are winsorized at 5% and 95%. The dependent variable, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 , is stock i‟s annual return during year 
t. All variables except return (r), leverage (L), firms size (S) and market-to-book ratio (MB) are standardized 
by firm‟s lagged market value (Mi,t−1). ∆Xi,t represents the one-year change in the level of variable X. Ci,t  
is cash holdings which is defined as cash and cash equivalents. Ei,t  is earnings before interest and 
extraordinary items plus interest expense on debt; NAi,t is calculated as total assets minus cash and cash 
equivalents; 𝑙𝑖,𝑡  is interest expense; Di,t is total cash common dividends paid; Li,t is measured as total 
debt divided by the sum of total debt and market value of equity; MBi,t−1 is market value to book value and 
Si,t−1 is measured as natural logarithm of total assets.  p(L-H=0) is the p-value of the added interaction 
term (High growth dummy*∆Ci,t) to the equations to test whether there is a significant difference in marginal 
value of cash between low and high growth firms. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. In Panel B a) indicates significant 
differences between German and Chinese firms at 5% level using the t-test and assuming unequal 
variances. b) indicates significant differences between German and Chinese firms at 5% level based on the 




We examine the differences in the marginal value of cash holdings across countries by using a 
sample of German and Chinese firms with panel data from 2000 to 2012. We use a long-term 
event study methodology and– contrary to the received literature- we do not find a marginal 
value of cash smaller than 1 in China, despite the fact that it has an emerging market economy. 
On average, the contribution of €1 extra cash holdings to shareholder value is €1.06 and €1.25 
for German and Chinese firms, respectively. The marginal value of cash is higher for firms with a 
low cash level, a low debt level and for three measures of constrained firms, namely small firms, 
service firms and growth firms. These results hold for both countries and the differences between 
constrained and unconstrained firms are consistent with the findings of Faulkender and Wang 
(2006). 
In line with our hypothesis we find that the marginal value of cash is higher in China than 
in Germany for small firms and for service firms. This suggests that information asymmetry 
differences across countries play a role in the valuation of cash holdings in firms with high costs 
of external financing. We, furthermore, do not find conclusive evidence on the differences 
between Germany and China for unconstrained firms. This implies that the difference in 
shareholder protection between Germany and China does not make a difference for these 
unconstrained firms. 
We also find that the shareholders of German firms attach a higher marginal value of 
cash to high growth firms than they do to small and service firms. It suggests that German 
investors are concerned and are willing to allow these high growth firms to reap their growth 
opportunities and that they therefore prefer these firms to have relatively high cash holdings. In 
contrast, financial constrains of small firms and service firms are the main concern for the 
investors in China. This is not really amazing as the whole of the Chinese economy showed high 
growth rates, and small firms and service firms may then in particular have difficult access to 
financial markets. 
Our findings have implications for managers, investors and science. In both countries it 
is not optimal for unconstrained firms to hoard cash and therefore cash levels in these firms 
could better be reduced. Constrained firms would -also in Germany- benefit from holding more 
cash. Overall, our findings suggest that it would be wise for investors to treat cash holdings in 










and service firms in China differently from cash holdings in comparable German firms. Finally, 
we think that scientists would do wise not to ignore the differences between constrained and 
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